REMARKS ON EVOLUTION AND TIME-SCALES, Graham Cairns-Smith; HODGSON'S BLACK BOX, Thomas Clark; DO HODGSON'S PROPOSITIONS UNIQUELY CHARACTERIZE FREE WILL?, Ravi Gomatam; WHAT SHOULD WE RETAIN FROM A PLAIN PERSON'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL?, Gilberto Gomes; ISOLATING DISPARATE CHALLENGES TO HODGSON'S ACCOUNT OF FREE WILL, Liberty Jaswal; FREE AGENCY AND LAWS OF NATURE, Robert Kane; SCIENCE VERSUS REALIZATION OF VALUE, NOT DETERMINISM VERSUS CHOICE, Nicholas Maxwell; COMMENTS ON HODGSON, J.J.C. Smart; THE VIEW FROM WITHIN, Sean Spence; COMMENTARY ON HODGSON, (...) Henry Stapp. (shrink)

Three-dimensionalists , sometimes referred to as endurantists, think that objects persist through time by being “wholly present” at every time they exist. But what is it for something to be wholly present at a time? It is surprisingly difficult to say. The threedimensionalist is free, of course, to take ‘is wholly present at’ as one of her theory’s primitives, but this is problematic for at least one reason: some philosophers claim not to understand her primitive. Clearly the three-dimensionalist would be (...) better off if she could state her theory in terms accessible to all. We think she can. What is needed is a definition of ‘is wholly present at’ that all can understand. in this paper, we offer one. (shrink)

Given any proposition, is it possible to have rationally acceptable attitudes towards it? Absent reasons to the contrary, one would probably think that this should be possible. In this paper I provide a reason to the contrary. There is a proposition such that, if one has any opinions about it at all, one will have a rationally unacceptable set of propositional attitudes—or if one doesn’t, one will end up being cognitively imperfect in some other manner. The proposition I am concerned (...) with is a self-referential propositional attitude ascription involving the propositional attitude of rejection. Given a basic assumption about what constitutes irrationality, and a few assumptions about the nature of cognitively ideal agents, a paradox results. This paradox is superficially like the Liar, but it is importantly different in that no alethic notions are involved at all. As such, it stands independent of the Liar and is not a ‘revenge’ version of it. After setting out the paradox I discuss possible responses. After considering several I argue that one is best off simply accepting that the paradox shows us something surprising and interesting about rationality: that some cognitive shortfall is unavoidable even for ideal agents. I argue that nothing disastrous follows from accepting this conclusion. (shrink)

forall x: Calgary is a full-featured textbook on formal logic. It covers key notions of logic such as consequence and validity of arguments, the syntax of truth-functional propositional logic TFL and truth-table semantics, the syntax of first-order (predicate) logic FOL with identity (first-order interpretations), symbolizing English in TFL and FOL, and Fitch-style natural deduction proof systems for both TFL and FOL. It also deals with some advanced topics such as modal logic, soundness, and functional completeness. Exercises with solutions are available. (...) It is provided in PDF (for screen reading, printing, and a special version for dyslexics), HTML, and in LaTeX source code. (shrink)

When some P implies some Q, this should have some impact on what attitudes we take to P and Q. In other words: logical consequence has a normative import. I use this idea, recently explored by a number of scholars, as a stepping stone to a bolder view: that relations of logical consequence can be identified with norms on our propositional attitudes, or at least that our talk of logical consequence can be explained in terms of such norms. I investigate (...) the prospects of such a cognitive norm account of logical consequence. I go over the challenges involved in finding a plausible bridge principle connecting logical consequence to cognitive norms, in particular a biconditional principle that gives us not only necessary but sufficient conditions for logical consequence in terms of norms on propositional attitudes. Then, on the assumption that an adequate norm can be found, I consider what the philosophical merits of such a cognitive norm account would be, and what theoretical commitments it would generate. (shrink)

What determines whether an object is an artwork? In this paper I consider what I will call ‘social’ theories of art, according to which the arthood of objects depends in some way on the art-related social practices that we have. Though such a dependence claim is plausible in principle, social theories of art tend to unpack the determining link between artworks and social practices in terms of intentional relations between the objects in question and the people involved in the relevant (...) practices. This intentionalism has unappealing upshots. Drawing on two-dimensional approaches in social ontology, I show how social theories of art can be done differently, improving their prospects. (shrink)

Livro-texto de introdução à lógica, com (mais do que) pitadas de filosofia da lógica, produzido como uma versão revista e ampliada do livro Forallx: Calgary. Trata-se da versão de 13 de outubro de 2022. Comentários, críticas, correções e sugestões são muito bem-vindos.

We propose a multi-step evaluation schema designed to help procurement agencies and others to examine the ethical dimensions of autonomous systems to be applied in the security sector, including autonomous weapons systems.

Abstract. The aim of this paper is to present a topological method for constructing discretizations (tessellations) of conceptual spaces. The method works for a class of topological spaces that the Russian mathematician Pavel Alexandroff defined more than 80 years ago. Alexandroff spaces, as they are called today, have many interesting properties that distinguish them from other topological spaces. In particular, they exhibit a 1-1 correspondence between their specialization orders and their topological structures. Recently, a special type of Alexandroff spaces was (...) used by Ian Rumfitt to elucidate the logic of vague concepts in a new way. According to his approach, conceptual spaces such as the color spectrum give rise to classical systems of concepts that have the structure of atomic Boolean algebras. More precisely, concepts are represented as regular open regions of an underlying conceptual space endowed with a topological structure. Something is subsumed under a concept iff it is represented by an element of the conceptual space that is maximally close to the prototypical element p that defines that concept. This topological representation of concepts comes along with a representation of the familiar logical connectives of Aristotelian syllogistics in terms of natural settheoretical operations that characterize regular open interpretations of classical Boolean propositional logic. In the last 20 years, conceptual spaces have become a popular tool of dealing with a variety of problems in the fields of cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics and philosophy, mainly due to the work of Peter Gärdenfors and his collaborators. By using prototypes and metrics of similarity spaces, one obtains geometrical discretizations of conceptual spaces by so-called Voronoi tessellations. These tessellations are extensionally equivalent to topological tessellations that can be constructed for Alexandroff spaces. Thereby, Rumfitt’s and Gärdenfors’s constructions turn out to be special cases of an approach that works for a more general class of spaces, namely, for weakly scattered Alexandroff spaces. This class of spaces provides a convenient framework for conceptual spaces as used in epistemology and related disciplines in general. Alexandroff spaces are useful for elucidating problems related to the logic of vague concepts, in particular they offer a solution of the Sorites paradox (Rumfitt). Further, they provide a semantics for the logic of clearness (Bobzien) that overcomes certain problems of the concept of higher2 order vagueness. Moreover, these spaces help find a natural place for classical syllogistics in the framework of conceptual spaces. The crucial role of order theory for Alexandroff spaces can be used to refine the all-or-nothing distinction between prototypical and nonprototypical stimuli in favor of a more fine-grained gradual distinction between more-orless prototypical elements of conceptual spaces. The greater conceptual flexibility of the topological approach helps avoid some inherent inadequacies of the geometrical approach, for instance, the so-called “thickness problem” (Douven et al.) and problems of selecting a unique metric for similarity spaces. Finally, it is shown that only the Alexandroff account can deal with an issue that is gaining more and more importance for the theory of conceptual spaces, namely, the role that digital conceptual spaces play in the area of artificial intelligence, computer science and related disciplines. Keywords: Conceptual Spaces, Polar Spaces, Alexandroff Spaces, Prototypes, Topological Tessellations, Voronoi Tessellations, Digital Topology. (shrink)

A good account of the agnostic attitude of Suspending Judgement should explain how it can be rendered more or less rational/justified according to the state of one's evidence – and one's relation to that evidence. I argue that the attitude of suspending judgement whether p constitutively involves having a belief; roughly, a belief that one cannot yet tell whether or not p. I show that a theory of suspending that treats it as a sui generis attitude, wholly distinct from belief, (...) struggles to account for how suspension of judgement can be rendered more or less rational (or irrational) by one's evidence. I also criticise the related idea that suspension essentially requires an 'Inquiring Attitude'. I show how a belief-based theory, in contrast, neatly accounts for the rational and epistemic features of suspending and so neatly accounts for why an agnostic has a genuine neutral opinion concerning the question whether p, as opposed to simply having no opinion. (shrink)

"Understanding Scientific Progress constitutes a potentially enormous and revolutionary advancement in philosophy of science. It deserves to be read and studied by everyone with any interest in or connection with physics or the theory of science. Maxwell cites the work of Hume, Kant, J.S. Mill, Ludwig Bolzmann, Pierre Duhem, Einstein, Henri Poincaré, C.S. Peirce, Whitehead, Russell, Carnap, A.J. Ayer, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Nelson Goodman, Bas van Fraassen, and numerous others. He lauds Popper for (...) advancing beyond verificationism and Hume’s problem of induction, but faults both Kuhn and Popper for being unable to show that and how their work could lead nearer to the truth." —Dr. LLOYD EBY teaches philosophy at The George Washington University and The Catholic University of America, in Washington, DC "Maxwell's aim-oriented empiricism is in my opinion a very significant contribution to the philosophy of science. I hope that it will be widely discussed and debated." – ALAN SOKAL, Professor of Physics, New York University "Maxwell takes up the philosophical challenge of how natural science makes progress and provides a superb treatment of the problem in terms of the contrast between traditional conceptions and his own scientifically-informed theory—aim-oriented empiricism. This clear and rigorously-argued work deserves the attention of scientists and philosophers alike, especially those who believe that it is the accumulation of knowledge and technology that answers the question."—LEEMON McHENRY, California State University, Northridge "Maxwell has distilled the finest essence of the scientific enterprise. Science is about making the world a better place. Sometimes science loses its way. The future depends on scientists doing the right things for the right reasons. Maxwell's Aim-Oriented Empiricism is a map to put science back on the right track."—TIMOTHY McGETTIGAN, Professor of Sociology, Colorado State University - Pueblo "Maxwell has a great deal to offer with these important ideas, and deserves to be much more widely recognised than he is. Readers with a background in philosophy of science will appreciate the rigour and thoroughness of his argument, while more general readers will find his aim-oriented rationality a promising way forward in terms of a future sustainable and wise social order."—David Lorimer, Paradigm Explorer, 2017/2 "This is a book about the very core problems of the philosophy of science. The idea of replacing Standard Empiricism with Aim-Oriented Empiricism is understood by Maxwell as the key to the solution of these central problems. Maxwell handles his main tool masterfully, producing a fascinating and important reading to his colleagues in the field. However, Nicholas Maxwell is much more than just a philosopher of science. In the closing part of the book he lets the reader know about his deep concern and possible solutions of the biggest problems humanity is facing."—Professor PEETER MŰŰREPP, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia “For many years, Maxwell has been arguing that fundamental philosophical problems about scientific progress, especially the problem of induction, cannot be solved granted standard empiricism (SE), a doctrine which, he thinks, most scientists and philosophers of science take for granted. A key tenet of SE is that no permanent thesis about the world can be accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independent of evidence. For a number of reasons, Maxwell argues, we need to adopt a rather different conception of science which he calls aim-oriented empiricism (AOE). This holds that we need to construe physics as accepting, as a part of theoretical scientific knowledge, a hierarchy of metaphysical theses about the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, which become increasingly insubstantial as we go up the hierarchy. In his book “Understanding Scientific Progress: Aim-Oriented Empiricism”, Maxwell gives a concise and excellent illustration of this view and the arguments supporting it… Maxwell’s book is a potentially important contribution to our understanding of scientific progress and philosophy of science more generally. Maybe it is the time for scientists and philosophers to acknowledge that science has to make metaphysical assumptions concerning the knowability and comprehensibility of the universe. Fundamental philosophical problems about scientific progress, which cannot be solved granted SE, may be solved granted AOE.” Professor SHAN GAO, Shanxi University, China . (shrink)

I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ propositions – i.e. a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on a plausible principle: (roughly stated) If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One motivation for denying this principle – viz. (...) opposition to ‘epistemic consequentialism’ – is briefly discussed. The principle is extended to cover degrees of belief and compared with a couple of other well-known constraints on rational degrees of belief. (shrink)

The crisis of our times is that we have science without wisdom. Modern science and technology lead to modern industry and agriculture which in turn lead to all the great benefits of the modern world and to the global crises we face, from population growth to climate change. The fault lies, not with science, but with science dissociated from a more fundamental concern with problems of living. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in academia so that the fundamental (...) task becomes to help humanity learn how to tackle problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, so that we may gradually discover how to make progress towards a better, wiser world. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere[1], is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is (...) to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve. [Back to Top]. (shrink)

In the Preface to Rationality, Steven Pinker remarks that “we are smart enough to have … articulated the rules of reason that we so often flout” (p. xiv). Unfortunately, Pinker does not get the rules of reason right in this book. Pinker defends a damagingly irrational conception of reason. But despite this rather drastic failure, there is much of interest in this book, even if at a rather elementary level.

What are the truth conditions of want ascriptions? According to an influential approach, they are intimately connected to the agent’s beliefs: ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff, within S’s belief set, S prefers the p worlds to the not-p worlds. This approach faces a well-known problem, however: it makes the wrong predictions for what we call (counter)factual want ascriptions, wherein the agent either believes p or believes not-p—for example, ‘I want it to rain tomorrow and that is exactly what is (...) going to happen’ or ‘I want this weekend to last forever, but of course it will end in a few hours’. We solve this problem. The truth conditions for want ascriptions are, we propose, connected to the agent’s conditional beliefs. We substantiate this connection by pursuing a striking parallel between (counter)factual and non-(counter)factual want ascriptions on the one hand and counterfactual and indicative conditionals on the other. (shrink)

Gallagher is right in pointing out that scientific realism is an implicit background assumption of BNO, and that I did not give an independent argument for it. He is also right in saying that science does not _demonstrate_ the existence of certain entities, but that it assumes those entities in a process of explanation and theory formation. However, it is not true that science, as Gallagher writes (p.2), “simply” assumes the reality of certain things: such assumptions are embedded in the (...) context of an attempt to find the_ minimal _ set of ontological assumptions one has to make relative to a set of explanatory goals and relative to a specific data set in a certain domain. This parsimonious spirit is also the <blockquote> PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ </blockquote> spirit of SMT, which can be seen as a search for the minimal conditions under which a phenomenal self and a consciously experienced first-person perspective can emerge. (shrink)

Urbaniana University Journal 73.3 (2020): 73-99. -/- A close reading of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion reveals that it is not what it appears. Rather than a work of natural theology, meant to show something about arguments concerning the existence and nature of God, the Dialogues turn out to embody a moral pedagogy exemplifying and attempting to instill a conception of piety and religion as virtues. This paper defends this interpretation by reviewing three alternative, but ultimately inadequate, interpretations of the (...) text, and then compares Hume’s moral pedagogy with that of Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae to highlight the ambition, and the limitation,of Hume’s attempt to characterize piety without metaphysics. (shrink)

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a global public health disaster driven largely by antibiotic use in human health care. Doctors considering whether to prescribe antibiotics face an ethical conflict between upholding individual patient health and advancing public health aims. Existing literature mainly examines whether patients awaiting consultations desire or expect to receive antibiotic prescriptions, but does not report views of the wider public regarding conditions under which doctors should prescribe antibiotics. It also does not explore the ethical significance of public views (...) or their sensitivity to awareness of AMR risks or the standpoint (self-interested or impartial) taken by participants. Methods: An online survey was conducted with a sample of the U.S. public (n = 158). Participants were asked to indicate what relative priority should be given to individual patients and society-at-large from various standpoints and in various contexts, including antibiotic prescription. Results: Of the participants, 50.3% thought that doctors should generally prioritize individual patients over society, whereas 32.0% prioritized society over individual patients. When asked in the context of AMR, 39.2% prioritized individuals whereas 45.5% prioritized society. Participants were significantly less willing to prioritize society over individuals when they themselves were the patient, both in general (p = .001) and in relation to AMR specifically (p = .006). Conclusions: Participants’ attitudes were more oriented to society and sensitive to collective responsibility when informed about the social costs of antibiotic use and when considered from a third-person rather than first-person perspective. That is, as participants came closer to taking the perspective of an informed and impartial “ideal observer,” their support for prioritizing society increased. Our findings suggest that, insofar as antibiotic policies and practices should be informed by attitudes that are impartial and well-informed, there is significant support for prioritizing society. (shrink)

There has been considerable debate in the literature as to whether work in experimental philosophy actually makes any significant contribution to philosophy. One stated view is that many X-Phi projects, notwithstanding their focus on topics relevant to philosophy, contribute little to philosophical thought. Instead, it has been claimed the contribution they make appears to be to cognitive science. In contrast to this view, here we argue that at least one approach to X-Phi makes a contribution which parallels, and also extends, (...) historically salient forms of philosophical analysis, especially contributions from Immanuel Kant, William James, Peter F. Strawson and Thomas Nagel. The framework elaborated here synthesizes philosophical theory with empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience and applies it to three perennial philosophical problems. According to this account, the origin of these three problems can be illuminated by viewing them as arising from a tension between two distinct types of cognition, each of which is associated with anatomically independent and functionally inhibitory neural networks. If the parallel we draw, between an empirical project and historically highly influential examples of philosophical analysis, is viewed as convincing, it follows that work in the cognitive sciences can contribute directly to philosophy. Further, this conclusion holds whether the empirical details of the account are correct or not. (shrink)

Peter Baumann offers the tantalizing suggestion that Thomas Reid is almost, but not quite, a pragmatist. He motivates this claim by posing a dilemma for common sense philosophy: Will it be dogmatism or scepticism? Baumann claims that Reid points to but does not embrace a pragmatist third way between these unsavory options. If we understand `pragmatism' differently than Baumann does, however, we need not be so equivocal in attributing it to Reid. Reid makes what we could call an argument (...) from practical commitment, and this is plausibly an instance of what William James calls the pragmatic method. (shrink)

I offer an alternative account of the relationship of Hobbesian geometry to natural philosophy by arguing that mixed mathematics provided Hobbes with a model for thinking about it. In mixed mathematics, one may borrow causal principles from one science and use them in another science without there being a deductive relationship between those two sciences. Natural philosophy for Hobbes is mixed because an explanation may combine observations from experience (the ‘that’) with causal principles from geometry (the ‘why’). My argument shows (...) that Hobbesian natural philosophy relies upon suppositions that bodies plausibly behave according to these borrowed causal principles from geometry, acknowledging that bodies in the world may not actually behave this way. First, I consider Hobbes's relation to Aristotelian mixed mathematics and to Isaac Barrow's broadening of mixed mathematics in Mathematical Lectures (1683). I show that for Hobbes maker's knowledge from geometry provides the ‘why’ in mixed-mathematical explanations. Next, I examine two explanations from De corpore Part IV: (1) the explanation of sense in De corpore 25.1-2; and (2) the explanation of the swelling of parts of the body when they become warm in De corpore 27.3. In both explanations, I show Hobbes borrowing and citing geometrical principles and mixing these principles with appeals to experience. (shrink)

Several recent commentators argue that Thomas Hobbes’s account of the nature of science is conventionalist. Engaging in scientific practice on a conventionalist account is more a matter of making sure one connects one term to another properly rather than checking one’s claims, e.g., by experiment. In this paper, I argue that the conventionalist interpretation of Hobbesian science accords neither with Hobbes’s theoretical account in De corpore and Leviathan nor with Hobbes’s scientific practice in De homine and elsewhere. Closely tied (...) to the conventionalist interpretation is the deductivist interpretation, on which it is claimed that Hobbes believed sciences such as optics are deduced from geometry. I argue that Hobbesian science places simplest conceptions as the foundation for geometry and the sciences in which we use geometry, which provides strong evidence against both the conventionalist and deductivist interpretations. (shrink)

Abstract Die moderne Physik besteht nicht nur aus neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen durch die Relativitätstheorie und durch die Quantenphysik. Sie besteht auch aus völlig neuen Sichtweisen und flexiblen Denkweisen von Zusammenhängen und Verschränkungen zwischen den Dingen. Die moderne Physik hat sich von dem Klischee des Schwarz-Weiß-Denkens verabschiedet, für das es nur getrennte Dinge, ohne fließende Übergänge gibt. Solche unbeweglichen, dogmatischen schwarzweißen Denkweisen können wir zurückverfolgen bis zu dem griechischen Philosophen Aristoteles. In der Zeit der Klassischen Mechanik hatten sie einen überwältigenden (...) Erfolg. Galilei behauptete, das Buch der Natur sei in der Sprache der Mathematik geschrieben. Das war die sehr kurzgefasste Formulierung der Klassischen Mechanik. Die moderne Physik hat sich keineswegs von der Mathematik verabschiedet, ganz und gar nicht. Doch der heilige Ernst und der starre und absolute Dogmatismus hat nachgelassen. Moderne Denkweisen in der Physik können mit den Begriffen von fließenden Übergängen, von Zwischenstufen, von Zusammenhängen zwischen den Dingen und von Schwingungen gekennzeichnet werden. Seit Faraday und Maxwell hat sich eine Verschiebung der Untersuchungsobjekte ergeben: Seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, seit ca 1850, drehen sich die Denkmodelle der modernen Physik nicht mehr um getrennte, isolierten Körper, die im Nichts schwimmen, sondern um die Zwischenräume zwischen den Körpern und um die flexiblen Beziehungsgeflechte zwischen den Dingen und um die Netzwerke, die die Dinge umgeben. Das sind ganz neue physikalische Denkweisen, die durchaus Dunkelzonen und Zweifel und Ungewissheiten kennen, die den Bereich der Exaktheit überschatten. Neue Beiträge der physikalischen Denkweisen sind auch durch eine Flexibilität bei der Bildung von Begriffen gekennzeichnet. Sie lassen sich nicht auf einige wenige Begriffe oder auf eine starre und exakte Festlegung der Wortwahl festnageln. „Jede Philosophie bezieht ihre Farbe von der geheimen Lichtquelle eines Vorstellungshintergrunds, der niemals ausdrücklich in ihren Gedankenketten auftaucht“ (Whitehead) (1). (shrink)

Thomas Reid is often misread as defending common sense, if at all, only by relying on illicit premises about God or our natural faculties. On these theological or reliabilist misreadings, Reid makes common sense assertions where he cannot give arguments. This paper attempts to untangle Reid's defense of common sense by distinguishing four arguments: (a) the argument from madness, (b) the argument from natural faculties, (c) the argument from impotence, and (d) the argument from practical commitment. Of these, (a) (...) and (c) do rely on problematic premises that are no more secure than claims of common sense itself. Yet (b) and (d) do not. This conclusion can be established directly by considering the arguments informally, but one might still worry that there is an implicit premise in them. In order to address this concern, I reconstruct the arguments in the framework of subjective Bayesianism. The worry becomes this: Do the arguments rely on specific values for the prior probability of some premises? Reid's appeals to our prior cognitive and practical commitments do not. Rather than relying on specific probability assignments, they draw on things that are part of the Bayesian framework itself, such as the nature of observation and the connection between belief and action. Contra the theological or reliabilist readings, the defense of common sense does not require indefensible premises. (shrink)

This paper examines Hobbes’s criticisms of Robert Boyle’s air-pump experiments in light of Hobbes’s account in _De Corpore_ and _De Homine_ of the relationship of natural philosophy to geometry. I argue that Hobbes’s criticisms rely upon his understanding of what counts as “true physics.” Instead of seeing Hobbes as defending natural philosophy as “a causal enterprise … [that] as such, secured total and irrevocable assent,” 1 I argue that, in his disagreement with Boyle, Hobbes relied upon his understanding of natural (...) philosophy as a mixed mathematical science. In a mixed mathematical science one can mix facts from experience with causal principles borrowed from geometry. Hobbes’s harsh criticisms of Boyle’s philosophy, especially in the _Dialogus Physicus, sive De natura aeris_, should thus be understood as Hobbes advancing his view of the proper relationship of natural philosophy to geometry in terms of mixing principles from geometry with facts from experience. Understood in this light, Hobbes need not be taken to reject or diminish the importance of experiment/experience; nor should Hobbes’s criticisms in _Dialogus Physicus_ be understood as rejecting experimenting as ignoble and not befitting a philosopher. Instead, Hobbes’s viewpoint is that experiment/experience must be understood within its proper place – it establishes the ‘that’ for a mixed mathematical science explanation. (shrink)

Griffiths and Stotz’s Genetics and Philosophy: An Introduction offers a very good overview of scientific and philosophical issues raised by present-day genetics. Examining, in particular, the questions of how a “gene” should be defined and what a gene does from a causal point of view, the authors explore the different domains of the life sciences in which genetics has come to play a decisive role, from Mendelian genetics to molecular genetics, behavioural genetics, and evolution. In this review, I highlight what (...) I consider as the two main theses of the book, namely: genes are better conceived as tools; genes become causes only in a context. I situate these two theses in the wider perspective of developmental systems theory. This leads me to emphasize that Griffiths and Stotz reflect very well an on going process in genetics, which I call the “epigenetization” of genetics, i.e., the growing interest in the complex processes by which gene activation is regulated. I then make a factual objection, which is that Griffiths and Stotz have almost entirely neglected the perspective of ecological developmental biology, and more precisely recent work on developmental symbioses, and I suggest that this omission is unfortunate in so far as an examination of developmental symbioses would have considerably strengthened Griffiths and Stotz’s own conclusions. (shrink)

The status of the laws of nature in Hobbes’s Leviathan has been a continual point of disagreement among scholars. Many agree that since Hobbes claims that civil philosophy is a science, the answer lies in an understanding of the nature of Hobbesian science more generally. In this paper, I argue that Hobbes’s view of the construction of geometrical figures sheds light upon the status of the laws of nature. In short, I claim that the laws play the same role as (...) the component parts – what Hobbes calls the “cause” – of geometrical figures. To make this argument, I show that in both geometry and civil philosophy, Hobbes proceeds by a method of synthetic demonstration as follows: 1) offering a thought experiment by privation; 2) providing definitions by explication of “simple conceptions” within the thought experiment; and 3) formulating generative definitions by making use of those definitions by explication. In just the same way that Hobbes says that the geometer should “put together” the parts of a square to learn its cause, I argue that the laws of nature are the cause of peace. (shrink)

Der Artikel beschäftigt sich mit dem englischen Philosophen Alfred North Whitehead und mit dem Vorstellungshintergrund, der seiner Philosophie zugrundeliegt. Der direkte Hintergrund seiner Philosophie ist die moderne Physik seit Michael Faraday und Maxwell, die als erste auf die elektromagnetischen Wellen und Schwingungen und Beziehungsgeflechte hingewiesen haben, die zwischen den Dingen liegen und die von Albert Einstein "Felder" genannt wurden. Wie sie aussehen, wissen wir bis heute nicht so genau, weil es Modellvorstellungen sind, deren Realität eigentlich nur durch Messungen belegt (...) ist. Das was zwischen den Dingen passiert ist später zu einer Hauptidee von Albert Einstein geworden, man denke nur an die Gravitationswellen, die erst vor wenigen Jahren entdeckt wurden. Einstein hatte sie vorausgesehen oder vorhergesagt. Die Quantenphysik ist voll von Wechselwirkungen zwischen den Objekten und von Verschränkungen, von Quantenverschränkungen. Deshalb spricht der Quantenphysiker Carlo Rovelli seit dem Jahre 2000 von einer "relationalen Quantenphysik". Diese Art von Relationen stellen den Hintergrund der Philosophie Whiteheads dar. (shrink)

This paper seeks to articulate the relationship between medieval logic and theology. Reviewing modern scholarship, we find that the purpose of medieval logic, when it is even inquired about, has proven difficult to articulate without reference to theology. This prompts reflection on the metaphors of logic as a “tool” and a “game”: a tool is not merely instrumental, insofar as it can have its own intrinsic goods and can shape and be shaped by that which it serves; likewise a game, (...) with its own intrinsic goods, may yet contribute to extrinsic goods as well. After reviewing some distinctive ways in which theology shaped developments of medieval logic, this paper summarizes key examples from the work of Thomas Aquinas where medieval logic shaped the articulation of, and is therefore crucial to a proper understanding of, theological arguments and claims. The conclusion suggests implications for future philosophical and theological work. (shrink)

In his book, History as a Science and the System of the Sciences, Thomas Seebohm articulates the view that history can serve to mediate between the sciences of explanation and the sciences of interpretation, that is, between the natural sciences and the human sciences. Among other things, Seebohm analyzes history from a phenomenological perspective to reveal the material foundations of the historical human sciences in the lifeworld. As a preliminary to his analyses, Seebohm examines the formal and material presuppositions (...) of phenomenological epistemology, as well as the emergence of the human sciences and the traditional distinctions and divisions that are made between the natural and the human sciences. -/- As part of this examination, Seebohm devotes a section to discussing Husserl’s formal mereology because he understands that a reflective analysis of the foundations of the historical sciences requires a reflective analysis of the objects of the historical sciences, that is, of concrete organic wholes (i.e., social groups) and of their parts. Seebohm concludes that Husserl’s mereological ontology needs to be altered with regard to the historical sciences because the relations between organic wholes and their parts are not summative relations. Seebohm’s conclusion is relevant for the issue of the reducibility of organic wholes such as social groups to their parts and for the issue of the reducibility of the historical sciences to the lower-order sciences, that is, to the sciences concerned with lower-order ontologies. -/- In this paper, I propose to extend Seebohm’s conclusion to the ontology of chemical wholes as object of quantum chemistry and to argue that Husserl’s formal mereology is descriptively inadequate for this regional ontology as well. This may seem surprising at first, since the objects studied by quantum chemists are not organic wholes. However, my discussion of atoms and molecules as they are understood in quantum chemistry will show that Husserl’s classical summative and extensional mereology does not accurately capture the relations between chemical wholes and their parts. This conclusion is relevant for the question of the reducibility of chemical wholes to their parts and of the reducibility of chemistry to physics, issues that have been of central importance within the philosophy of chemistry for the past several decades. (shrink)

Describes a Neoplatonic hierarchy of the cardinal virtues extending to immaterial beings, and compares its appropriation by Bonaventure and Aquinas.

Eine kurze Geschichte der Physik Abstract. Die moderne Physik besteht nicht nur aus neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen in den Relativitätstheorien und in der Quantenphysik. Sie besteht auch aus neuen Sichtweisen und Denkweisen von Zusammenhängen und Verschränkungen zwischen den Dingen. Die moderne Physik hat sich von dem Klischee des Schwarz-Weiß-Denkens verabschiedet, für das es keine Zwischenstufen zwischen den Dingen gibt. Aber gerade das zwischen den Dingen Liegende ist zum Kennzeichen der Denkweisen in der modernen Physik geworden. Seit Faraday und Maxwell (...) beschäftigt sich die moderne Physik nicht mehr mit dem Modell der isolierten Körper, die im Nichts schwimmen, sondern mit den Zwischenräumen zwischen den Körpern, mit dem flexiblen Beziehungsgeflecht zwischen den Dingen, mit dem Netzwerk, das die Dinge umgibt, das Faraday das „elektromagnetische Feld“ nannte. (shrink)

This paper sets mathematics among the sciences, despite not being empirical, because it studies relations of various sorts, like the sciences. Each empirical science studies the relations among objects, which relations determining which science. The mathematical science studies relations as such, regardless of what those relations may be or be among, how relations themselves are related. This places it at the extreme among the sciences with no objects of its own (A Subject with no Object, by J.P. Burgess and G. (...) Rosen). Examples are discussed. The historical development of written mathematics from algorithms on clay tablets to theorems with proofs is said to show that application of algorithms to specific problems and theorems to scientific objects is like allegorical interpretation. Mathematics fits into the modern scientific context because the sciences, beginning with Galileo, have been constructed in imitation of mathematics. Viewing mathematics this way does not solve any ontological problems, but it does show how mathematics avoids them. Epistemological problems, insuperable for object realism, are simplified. For example, we have access to relations among any objects that we can consider objectively, first physical objects and then mathematical objects of greater and greater abstraction. (shrink)

Thomas Polger and Laurence Shapiro argue that Carl Gillett's much publicized dimensioned theory of realization is incoherent, being subject to a reductio. Their argument turns on the fact that Gillett's definition of realization makes property instances the exclusive relata of the realization relation, while his belief in multiple realization implies its denial, namely, that properties are the relata of the realization relation on occasions of multiple realization. Others like Sydney Shoemaker have also expressed their view of realization in terms (...) of property instances, yet they too have accepted the multiple realizability of properties. Thus I am interested in the more general issue raised by Polger and Shapiro's argument. Specifically, I show how to supplement a theory of realization with a category-inclusive auxiliary assumption, which avoids the stated reductio. I then offer a few reasons to justify the proposed category-inclusive view of realization, making some comparisons to supervenience and causation along the way. (shrink)

Abstract Die moderne Physik besteht nicht nur aus neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen durch die Relativitätstheorie und durch die Quantenphysik. Sie besteht auch aus völlig neuen Sichtweisen und flexiblen Denkweisen von Zusammenhängen und Verschränkungen zwischen den Dingen. Die moderne Physik hat sich von dem Klischee des Schwarz-Weiß-Denkens verabschiedet, für das es nur getrennte Dinge, ohne fließende Übergänge gibt. Solche unbeweglichen, dogmatischen schwarzweißen Denkweisen können wir zurückverfolgen bis zu dem griechischen Philosophen Aristoteles. In der Zeit der Klassischen Mechanik hatten sie einen überwältigenden (...) Erfolg. Galilei behauptete, das Buch der Natur sei in der Sprache der Mathematik geschrieben. Das war die sehr kurzgefasste Formulierung der Klassischen Mechanik. Die moderne Physik hat sich keineswegs von der Mathematik verabschiedet, ganz und gar nicht. Doch der heilige Ernst und der starre und absolute Dogmatismus hat nachgelassen. Moderne Denkweisen in der Physik können mit den Begriffen von fließenden Übergängen, von Zwischenstufen, von Zusammenhängen zwischen den Dingen und von Schwingungen gekennzeichnet werden. Seit Faraday und Maxwell hat sich eine Verschiebung der Untersuchungsobjekte ergeben: Seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, seit ca 1850, drehen sich die Denkmodelle der modernen Physik nicht mehr um getrennte, isolierten Körper, die im Nichts schwimmen, sondern um die Zwischenräume zwischen den Körpern und um die flexiblen Beziehungsgeflechte zwischen den Dingen und um die Netzwerke, die die Dinge umgeben. Das sind ganz neue physikalische Denkweisen, die durchaus Dunkelzonen und Zweifel und Ungewissheiten kennen, die den Bereich der Exaktheit überschatten. Neue Beiträge der physikalischen Denkweisen sind auch durch eine Flexibilität bei der Bildung von Begriffen gekennzeichnet. Sie lassen sich nicht auf einige wenige Begriffe oder auf eine starre und exakte Festlegung der Wortwahl festnageln. -/- „Jede Philosophie bezieht ihre Farbe von der geheimen Lichtquelle eines Vorstellungshintergrunds, der niemals ausdrücklich in ihrenGedankenketten auftaucht“ (Whitehead) (1) . (shrink)

Louis Pojman and Robert Westmoreland have compiled the best material on the subject of equality, ranging from classical works by Aristotle, Hobbes and Rousseau to contemporary works by John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, Michael Walzer, Harry Frankfurt, Bernard Williams and Robert Nozick; and including such topics as: the concept of equality; equal opportunity; Welfare egalitarianism; resources; equal human rights and complex equality.

The influence of Cajetan’s De Nominum Analogia is due largely to its first three chapters, which introduce Cajetan’s three modes of analogy: analogy of inequality, analogy of attribution, and analogy of proportionality. Interpreters typically ignore the final eight chapters, which describe further features of analogy of proportionality. This article explains this neglect as a symptom of a failure to appreciate Cajetan’s particular semantic concerns, taken independently from the question of systematizing the thought of Aquinas. After an exegesis of the neglected (...) chapters, which describe the semantics of analogy through the three levels of cognition (simple apprehension, composition and division, and discursive reasoning), the article concludes with observations about the relationship between Cajetan and Aquinas and the philosophical and historical signifi cance of Cajetan’s approach to the semantics of analogy. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper restates the thesis of 'The Requirements of Justice and Liberal Socialism" where it was argued that liberal socialism best meets Rawlsian requirements of justice. The recent responses to this paper by Jan Narveson, Jeppe von Platz, and Alan Thomas merit examination and comment. This paper shows that if Rawlsian justice is to be met, then non-personal property must be subject to public control. If just outcomes merit the public control of non-personal property and this control is (...) not utilized, then justice has been subordinated to the objectively less important institution of private property. (shrink)

Aus einer langen Sicht der Menschheitsgeschichte - etwa in zehntausend Jahren - kann es kaum einen Zweifel daran geben, dass das bedeutendste Ereignis des 19. Jahrhunderts die Entdeckung der elektrodynamischen Gesetze durch Maxwell sein wird, Richard Feynman, 1964.

Abstract Die moderne Physik besteht nicht nur aus neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen durch die Relativitätstheorie und durch die Quantenphysik. Sie besteht auch aus völlig neuen Sichtweisen und flexiblen Denkweisen von Zusammenhängen und Verschränkungen zwischen den Dingen. Die moderne Physik hat sich von dem Klischee des Schwarz-Weiß-Denkens verabschiedet, für das es nur getrennte Dinge, ohne fließende Übergänge gibt. Solche unbeweglichen, dogmatischen schwarzweißen Denkweisen können wir zurückverfolgen bis zu dem griechischen Philosophen Aristoteles. In der Zeit der Klassischen Mechanik hatten sie einen überwältigenden (...) Erfolg. Galilei behauptete, das Buch der Natur sei in der Sprache der Mathematik geschrieben. Das war die sehr kurzgefasste Formulierung der Klassischen Mechanik. Die moderne Physik hat sich keineswegs von der Mathematik verabschiedet, ganz und gar nicht. Doch der heilige Ernst und der starre und absolute Dogmatismus hat nachgelassen. Moderne Denkweisen in der Physik können mit den Begriffen von fließenden Übergängen, von Zwischenstufen, von Zusammenhängen zwischen den Dingen und von Schwingungen gekennzeichnet werden. Seit Faraday und Maxwell hat sich eine Verschiebung der Untersuchungsobjekte ergeben: Seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, seit ca 1850, drehen sich die Denkmodelle der modernen Physik nicht mehr um getrennte, isolierten Körper, die im Nichts schwimmen, sondern um die Zwischenräume zwischen den Körpern und um die flexiblen Beziehungsgeflechte zwischen den Dingen und um die Netzwerke, die die Dinge umgeben. Das sind ganz neue physikalische Denkweisen, die durchaus Dunkelzonen und Zweifel und Ungewissheiten kennen, die den Bereich der Exaktheit überschatten. Neue Beiträge der physikalischen Denkweisen sind auch durch eine Flexibilität bei der Bildung von Begriffen gekennzeichnet. Sie lassen sich nicht auf einige wenige Begriffe oder auf eine starre und exakte Festlegung der Wortwahl festnageln. „Jede Philosophie bezieht ihre Farbe von der geheimen Lichtquelle eines Vorstellungshintergrunds, der niemals ausdrücklich in ihren Gedankenketten auftaucht“ (Whitehead) (1). (shrink)

In this article I contrast 17th and 18th explanations of hysteria including those of Sydenham and Willis with those given by Plato and pre-modern medicine. I show that beginning in the second decade of the 17th century the locus of the disorder was transferred to the nervous system and it was no longer connected with the womb as in Hippocrates and Galen; hysteria became identified with hypochondria, and was a disease contracted by men as well as women. I discuss the (...) purely mechanical explanation of hysteria given by Robert Boyle who attributed its cause to corporeal ideas as well as overly sensitive disposition of the nervous system. I relate this the mechanical theory of the nervous system prominent in Descartes' writings on physiology. The paper closes with a discussion of the contrast between early modern explanations of hysteria and the nature of man with those of Freud in the early 20th century. (shrink)

Abstract Die moderne Physik besteht nicht nur aus neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen durch die Relativitätstheorie und durch die Quantenphysik. Sie besteht auch aus völlig neuen Sichtweisen und flexiblen Denkweisen von Zusammenhängen und Verschränkungen zwischen den Dingen. Die moderne Physik hat sich von dem Klischee des Schwarz-Weiß-Denkens verabschiedet, für das es nur getrennte Dinge, ohne fließende Übergänge gibt. Solche unbeweglichen, dogmatischen schwarzweißen Denkweisen können wir zurückverfolgen bis zu dem griechischen Philosophen Aristoteles. In der Zeit der Klassischen Mechanik hatten sie einen überwältigenden (...) Erfolg. Galilei behauptete, das Buch der Natur sei in der Sprache der Mathematik geschrieben. Das war die sehr kurzgefasste Formulierung der Klassischen Mechanik. Die moderne Physik hat sich keineswegs von der Mathematik verabschiedet, ganz und gar nicht. Doch der heilige Ernst und der starre und absolute Dogmatismus hat nachgelassen. Moderne Denkweisen in der Physik können mit den Begriffen von fließenden Übergängen, von Zwischenstufen, von Zusammenhängen zwischen den Dingen und von Schwingungen gekennzeichnet werden. Seit Faraday und Maxwell hat sich eine Verschiebung der Untersuchungsobjekte ergeben: Seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, seit ca 1850, drehen sich die Denkmodelle der modernen Physik nicht mehr um getrennte, isolierte Körper, die im Nichts schwimmen, sondern um die Zwischenräume zwischen den Körpern und um die flexiblen Beziehungsgeflechte zwischen den Dingen und um die Netzwerke, die die Dinge umgeben. Das sind ganz neue physikalische Denkweisen, die durchaus Dunkelzonen und Zweifel und Ungewissheiten kennen, die den Bereich der Exaktheit überschatten. Neue Beiträge der physikalischen Denkweisen sind auch durch eine Flexibilität bei der Bildung von Begriffen gekennzeichnet. Sie lassen sich nicht auf einige wenige Begriffe oder auf eine starre und exakte Festlegung der Wortwahl festnageln. „Jede Philosophie bezieht ihre Farbe von der geheimen Lichtquelle eines Vorstellungshintergrunds, der niemals ausdrücklich in ihren Gedankenketten auftaucht“ (Whitehead) (1). (shrink)

Abstract Die moderne Physik besteht nicht nur aus neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen durch die Relativitätstheorien und durch die Quantenphysik. Sie besteht auch aus völlig neuen Sichtweisen und völlig neuen Denkweisen von Zusammenhängen und Verschränkungen zwischen den Dingen. Die moderne Physik hat sich von dem Klischee des Schwarz-Weiß-Denkens verabschiedet, für das es nur getrennte Dinge, ohne fließende Übergänge zwischen den Dingen gibt. Diese Denkweisen können wir zurückverfolgen bis zu dem griechischen Philosophen Aristoteles. Während modernen Denkweisen in der Physik mit den Begriffen (...) von fließende Übergängen, von Zwischenstufen, von Zusammenhängen und von Schwingungen gekennzeichnet werden können. Seit Faraday und Maxwell drehen sich die Denkmodelle der modernen Physik nicht mehr um getrennte, isolierten Körper, die im Nichts schwimmen, sondern um die Zwischenräume zwischen den Körpern und um die flexiblen Beziehungsgeflechte zwischen den Dingen und um die Netzwerke, die die Dinge umgeben. Das sind ganz neue Denkweisen. In diesen Kategorien denken zunächst einmal nur die physikalischen Wissenschaften. (shrink)

Abstract Die moderne Physik besteht nicht nur aus neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen durch die Relativitätstheorie und durch die Quantenphysik. Sie besteht auch aus völlig neuen Sichtweisen und flexiblen Denkweisen von Zusammenhängen und Verschränkungen zwischen den Dingen. Die moderne Physik hat sich von dem Klischee des Schwarz-Weiß-Denkens verabschiedet, für das es nur getrennte Dinge, ohne fließende Übergänge gibt. Solche unbeweglichen, dogmatischen schwarzweißen Denkweisen können wir zurückverfolgen bis zu dem griechischen Philosophen Aristoteles. In der Zeit der Klassischen Mechanik hatten sie einen überwältigenden (...) Erfolg. Galilei behauptete, das Buch der Natur sei in der Sprache der Mathematik geschrieben. Das war die sehr kurzgefasste Formulierung der Klassischen Mechanik. Die moderne Physik hat sich keineswegs von der Mathematik verabschiedet, ganz und gar nicht. Doch der heilige Ernst und der starre und absolute Dogmatismus hat nachgelassen. Moderne Denkweisen in der Physik können mit den Begriffen von fließenden Übergängen, von Zwischenstufen, von Zusammenhängen zwischen den Dingen und von Schwingungen gekennzeichnet werden. Seit Faraday und Maxwell hat sich eine Verschiebung der Untersuchungsobjekte ergeben: Seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, seit ca 1850, drehen sich die Denkmodelle der modernen Physik nicht mehr um getrennte, isolierten Körper, die im Nichts schwimmen, sondern um die Zwischenräume zwischen den Körpern und um die flexiblen Beziehungsgeflechte zwischen den Dingen und um die Netzwerke, die die Dinge umgeben. Das sind ganz neue physikalische Denkweisen, die durchaus Dunkelzonen und Zweifel und Ungewissheiten kennen, die den Bereich der Exaktheit überschatten. Neue Beiträge der physikalischen Denkweisen sind auch durch eine Flexibilität bei der Bildung von Begriffen gekennzeichnet. Sie lassen sich nicht auf einige wenige Begriffe oder auf eine starre und exakte Festlegung der Wortwahl festnageln. „Jede Philosophie bezieht ihre Farbe von der geheimen Lichtquelle eines Vorstellungshintergrunds, der niemals ausdrücklich in ihren Gedankenketten auftaucht“ (Whitehead) (1). (shrink)

A fundamental problem in understanding the nature of time is explaining its directionality. This 1990 PhD thesis re-examines the concepts of time flow, the physical directionality of time, and the semantics of tensed language. Several novel results are argued for that contradict the orthodox anti-realist views still dominant in the subject. Specifically, the concept of "metaphysical time flow" is supported as a valid scientific concept, and argued to be intrinsic to the directionality of objective probabilities in quantum mechanics; the common (...) claims that quantum probability theory is time reversible is shown to be based on an analytic error, stemming from a false choice for the criterion for reversibility of probabilistic theories (recognized by Satosi Watanabe in the 1950s but ignored in all philosophical discussions); and a consistent semantics for tensed language (adapted from the tree model of Storrs McCall) is constructed, showing that the common rejection of "time flow" as having no meaningful semantics is false. These debates are still ongoing in almost exactly the same state they were pre-1990, and there is appears to be no visible progress in the subject. Critical points made against errors in the orthodox account (which has been sustained for 70 years by the anti-realist philosophy of time, typified by the "Pittsburg School" of Grunbaum-Earman-Norton-Roberts), are still not recognized in the philosophy of time or physics. Some key technical proofs in this thesis have been published in physics proper. See p.ii-iii for full original abstract. (This pdf is uploaded from the Massey University archive.). (shrink)

Open theists deny that God knows future contingents. Most open theists justify this denial by adopting the position that there are no future contingent truths to be known. In this paper we examine some of the arguments put forward for this position in two recent articles in this journal, one by Dale Tuggy and one by Alan Rhoda, Gregory Boyd, and Thomas Belt. The arguments concern time, modality, and the semantics of ‘will’ statements. We explain why we find none (...) of these arguments persuasive. This wide road leads only to destruction. (shrink)